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The simplistic attribution of Ireland's woes to
seven centuries of British rule wears thin as,
almost 60 years after an independent Irish State
was established, the decline in the number of
people at work in Ireland continues. Even the
modernised version of the old bogyman,
re-labelled 'British neo-colonialism'to escape
which Ireland, with much apparent relief,
surrendered a considerable portion of its not-
long-won sovereignty to join the EEChas little
credibility left as the slide in job numbers con-
tinues, and even accelerates, five years after
Ireland joined the EEC. It is time for a
reappraisal, and in that reappraisal the insights
of development economics promise to be
revealing. Moreover, as a well-documented case
study of the original colony of the capitalist era,
the Irish sequence of growth and decline, of the
optimism of independence giving way to the
disillusionment of failure, can add much to the
corpus of knowledge about the process of both
development and undevelopment.
Flank protection
The thorny subject of Anglo-Irish relations can
be viewed instructively in the context of Britain's
changing overseas role. Like two grazing animals
spanned together, the dominant power pulled the
lesser now one way, now another, as it pursued
its interests: first carving out the most extensive
empire in history; then reaping the fruits of
empire; and, more recently, retreating from
empire to build a new position for itself on
Europe's periphery.
Centuries of desultory, ineffective, pre-capitalist,
Anglo-Norman colonising attempts in Ireland
preceded the violent, complete conquest of the
island that was an early, strategically essential
step in Elizabethan England's drive towards over-
seas greatness. As if to underline awareness of
the need for flank protection in the exercise of
empire-building, several of England's adven-
turers in the newly settled American colonies
were also to the fore among those who conquered,
appropriated and settled Ireland's land with an
English protestant garrison, most of whom were
settled in the north-east (Wellerstein, 1974 : 88).
A secured Ireland was strategically essential for
Britain as it established abroad the profitable
complementary trading relationships that multi-
plied its small initial capital stock. But a secured
Ireland, its resources mobilised for the garrison's
profit, threatened to flood Britain with competing
pastoral products, wiping out the profits from
English land that were the principal source of
finance for the first stages of imperial expansion.
Protests were heard in the House of Commons in
1621, barely two decades after the trade had
commenced, against imports of Irish cattle, stated
to be 100,000 annually (Clarke, 1966). The figure,
though an exaggeration, would have represented
in relation to the contemporary population more
than Britain's total present meat imports. The
Cattle Acts, passed by the Restoration Parliament,
banned all imports of Irish pastoral products and
isolated pastoral Ireland from its British market,
other than as an outlet for English corn, which
under the Corn Laws, was dumped in Ireland
in most years up to the great divide of 1760.
The Cattle Acts
The century-and-a-half between the passing of the
Cattle Acts and the Battle of Waterloo, during
most of which the British market was denied to
Irish pastoral products, was, for Ireland, a period
of sustained, rapid growth fuelled partly by
exports of linen yarn and cloth to England and
of highly processed pastoral products (salted and
barrelled butter, beef and pig meat) to other, more
distant, markets. Primitive with respect to its
population, wealth, and the sophistication of its
institutions at the commencement of the period,
Ireland, at the end, had a population that was
one half and a foreign trade that was one quarter
that of England. This record controverts many
neo-classical generalisations about economic
growth, though not that of the tremendous efficacy
of the unbridled pursuit of profit as an instrument
for change. Rarely was a society so effectively
mobilised to generate profit for its ruling class,
with what success may be gauged from the fact
that Irish land, that could not be sold for one
shilling an acre shortly before the passing of the
Cattle Acts, could not be bought for £20 an acre
at the time of Waterloo (Bottigheimer, 1971;
Maguire, 1972).
Crucial new features were introduced in the latter
part of this period of growth, coinciding, more
or less, with the traditionally accepted commence-
ment of the English industrial revolution; with
England's transformation from a grain-exporter
to a grain-importer in most years; and with first,
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in 1758, the suspension, and then, in 1776, the
repeal of the Cattle Acts. This was a phase of
firm British demand for Irish farm produce,
especially grain, butter and pig meat. It gave rise
in southern Irelanduniquely outside tropical
riverine and monsoon crop-growing areasto an
agricultural proletariat that became the largest
social class in the land. The genesis of the Irish
agricultural proletariat lay in a combination of
peculiar production conditions that required grain
crops to be frequently interspersed with potato
crops, a highly competitive land market, and
relatively low cattle prices. This combination of
circumstances made it transiently possible for
capital-less young persons in Ireland to produce
from land a subsistence and a surplus for
competitive rent. The capital-less Irish, uniquely
in a less hospitable northern climate, did it by
growing, on land exhausted by grain crops,
enough potatoes for subsistence and for fattening
pigs that were sold to pay a higher rent than
graziers of relatively low-priced cattle could
afford. The birth rate was forced towards its
biological limit, as in all 'traditional' societies
where a subsistence can be got without capital.
Land profits were enhanced in the process by
the proceeds of pig sales. There is an almost
perfect correlation (r2=O.98) between the growth
of population and of pig exports in Ireland
between 1712 and 1831; an additional pig was
exported for every increase of seven in the
pcpulatio' (Connell, 1950 : 25; Crotty, 1966
2? 7).
The combination of circumstances that was the
necessary and sufficient condition for the growth
of an agricultural proletariat that was restricted
only within biological limits did not obtain in all
parts of Ireland. The rights in land which the
protestant tenants of northern Ireland had, as
members of the armed, planter, garrison class,
made the land market there less competitive.
Capital-less young people had less ready access
to land. They were compelled instead, like their
coevals in England, to work at the expanding
textile industry; linen in Ireland and wool in
England.
Union
Apprehension that the highly developed Irish
colony, which by the end of the eighteenth century
had a considerable degree of autonomy, would
follow the American path to republicanism and,
in so doing, provide a dangerous foothold for
imperial Britain's competitors and enemies was a
factor in bringing about the political and
economic union of the two islands in 1800.
Equally important was the fact that Britain's
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economy had developed beyond the stage where
it had anything to fear from Ireland's competing
imports to the stage where its mushrooming
factories had much to gain from freer access to
the considerable Irish market. The Act of Union,
passed by the Westminster and Dublin Parlia-
ments, had no less support from Irish publie
opinion. This, as conceived and expressed at the
time, was as favourable to Union in 1800 as it
was to Ireland's recent accession to the EEC
which was supported in a referendum by four-
fifths of the electorate (Bolton, 1966).
The century following Union, the high noon of
empire for Britain, was a time of unmitigated
disaster for Ireland. In probably the first, and
certainly the most extreme, case of the now much
better understood and documented phenomenon
of core economies developing at the expense of
peripheral ones, Britain grew to dwarf and shade
the neighbouring economy.
It was, in Britain, the age of modern factory
capitalism. The single most critical consequence
for Ireland of the growth of British factory
capitalism has been the increase in demand for
beef relative to other farm products. This, since
Waterloo, has caused the price of beef in Ireland
to quadruple relative to the price of wheat and to
double relative to the price of butter. It has made
profitable the substitution of labour extensive
cattle rearing for all other activities. It has caused
the human population of southern Ireland to
decline from seven to three million and the cattle
population to increase from two to six million
between 1841 and 1971 (BPP 1843; Ireland,
1974).
Movement of labour from agriculture into manu-
facturing industry, to replace imports or to
produce for export, was a theoretically possible
adjustment in the open Irish economy. Pressure
of population and unemployment should have
reduced wages, making Irish industry more
competitive at home and abroad, as proponents
of an incomes policy in Ireland now argue. There
were two offsetting considerations. First, as land
was transferred from crop-growing to cattle-
rearing, the supply of agricultural raw materials
for processing either ceased to expand or
declined: production of milk for the dairy
industry did not increase from 1830 to 1960;
grain production for the milling industry declined;
output of pigs stabilised and many were diverted
from the bacon industry to the live trade; and
though cattle output increased, the live trade took
an increasing proportion and soon all of the
output, ending a centuries-old provision trade.
Second, income decline in the age of factory
capitalism and on the isolated periphery, is a
double-edged affair. Lower wages imply a
contracting home market and, therefore, higher
fixed costs per unit, which are unlikely to be
sufficiently offset by wage reductions to make
exports possible. Lower wages can in this way
result in competing imports absorbing a larger
proportion of a declining market.
Famine, disease and emigration removed the
agricultural proletariat that, with rising cattle and
sheep prices, no longer yielded .a profit to land,
and could not be transformed into an industrial
proletariat. Labour and savings were drained
abroad, where, being rootless, mobile and
adaptable, they frequently operated in the van
of the capitalist core's expansion, deployed a
missionaries, soldiers, teachers, administrators,
planters, labourers,' or as risk capital, wherever
they yielded the highest profit and best expedited
the 'growth of empire'. It was a pattern, once
established, of stable decline: the outflow of
resources kept the peripheral economy small and
inefficient, ensuring low returns that would
continue to drive resources abroad; and the
outflow created a political vacuum that precluded
the radical, structural changes necessary to raise
productivity.
Cultural absorption was part of the integrating
process. The Gaelic language that survived the
violence of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
and the attempts, in the eighteenth century under
the Penal Laws, to root out the indigenous
culture, continued to be the language of the
majority up to the Union. Its subsequent decline
was rapid. A typical contemporary observation in
the early nineteenth century was that Gaelic "is
falling a good deal into disuse among them; the
tradespeople transacting their business in English
for the most part, so that the poor Irishman now
finds it to his advantage to know that language
for more easy communication in his dealings"
(Shaw Mason, 1819). Cultural absorption
facilitated economic integration; it facilitated the
inflow of manufactured goods and the outflow
of labour and savings.
The Irish periphery's population declined from
6.8 to 4.5 million while the English core's
increased from 11.3 to 33.6 million between
1821 and 1911. (British Parliamentary Papers,
1822, 1824, 1912-13 and 1914-16.) Decline in the
periphery was not uniform however. The popula-
tion of the predominantly protestant northern
Ireland was the same in 1911 as in 1821: 1.4
1 Engels referred less flatteringly to the flood of Irish emigrants
as fulfilling 'the notorious function of supplying England,
America, Australia, etc., with prostitutes, casual-labourers,
pimps, thieves, beggars and other rabble" (Marx and Engels,
1943).
million. The entire 2.3 million population decline
occurred in the overwhelmingly catholic south.
These very different demographic experiences
owed little to divergences in dogma, but much to
divergences in status: of privileged and
oppressed, of garrison and garrisoned, which
in Ireland was distinguished by religion as in other
colonies it was to be distinguished by race.
Northern Ireland maintained its population
because of the growth of Belfast. That, in turn,
was based on linen and shipbuilding. Protestant
privilege, as expressed by the 'Ulster custom' of
tenant-right, had caused the concentration of
flax-growing and the linen industry in the north
before the Union. The impetus of this early
industrialisation in the north was maintained
after the Union by three factors, despite the
centripetal pull that denuded the rest of the Irish
periphery of industry. First, linen, alone of the
staple Irish export industries, continued to have
its raw material locally produced in increasing
quantities; flax-growing was the only agricultural
enterprise that could compete in nineteenth
century Ireland with the rearing of store cattle
for the- British market. Second, northern Ireland's
secondary manufacturing industry, shipbuilding,
which evolved from the linen industry, was
peculiarly well suited to minimise the disadvan-
tages of distance from raw materials (by adding
greatly to their value before re-exporting them)
and from markets (by floating the product to
these), and to get maximum benefit from the
area's third strength.its disciplined, adaptable
labour force.
The garrison status of northern Ireland
protestants, a reaction to their massacre by the
island's catholic majority in 1641, 1688 and 1798,
created an identity of interest between protestant
labour and protestant capital that was conducive
to tight industrial discipline and innovation.
Discipline and innovation were the more readily
acceptable by protestant workers because much
of the cost could be placed on the catholic hebt
class, to whom were relegated the lower paid,
less congenial and less secure employments.
Economic integration: political disintegration
The core's growth and the periphery's decline
transformed the relative class structures of the
two regions. Almost every other person surviving
to adulthood left Ireland, to make way for cattle
and to swell the proletariat in England and other
growth centres, leaving in southern Ireland a
residual population of which the bourgeoisie
became an ever-increasing proportion. As the class
structures of the two regions of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland changed,
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so their class interests diverged. The British
connection, deemed essential at the beginning of
the nineteenth century to thwart a Jacobin take-
over in Ireland, was, by the end of the century,
seen, increasingly, as a threat to Irish bourgeois
interests, made otherwise absolutely secure in the
southern part of the island by the regular outflow
of that half of the oncoming population who had
neither jobs nor property, but who found it easier
to change their domicile than the social order
in their birthplace. The southern catholic,
pastoralist, Irish bourgeoisie, more secure witliin
Ireland than the ruling class in any other Euro-
pean country, were prepared to secede from the
Union to advance or to defend their vital class
interests. They threatened to do so in 1880 in
order to end the payment of rents to the heirs
of the original confiscators of Ireland's tribal
lands, and were bought off by successive Land
Acts which, with financing from the British core,
transferred title from landlords to grazier-
occupiers. The southern Irish bourgeoisie did
secede from the Union when Britain in 1917
attempted to conscript their sons (hunger having
years earlier driven the remnants of the Irish
proletariat into Britain's army).
The bourgeoisie on both occasions appropriated
and adapted for their own purpose existing
populist, radical movements. The agrarian move-
ment of the Mayo smallholders and cottiers that,
under pressure from expanding cattle stocks,
sought to nationalise land became the Irish Land
Conference of representatives of Irish cattle
graziers and of Irish and Anglo-Irish landlords.
This, under the chairmanship of the Earl of
Dunraven, agreed that ownership of the land
should be transferred from landlords to farmers,
the British State being called upon "to bridge
the gap between the price the owners could
afford to take and the price the tenants could
afford to give" (Crotty, 1966). The aborted
socialist republic of 1916 became the Irish Free
State of the 1920s that, before 'demand manage-
ment' made government borrowing respectable,
cut old age pensions to balance a flagging budget.
A Britain moving towards a social democracy that
was anathema to the southern Irish bourgeoisie
had as little stomach for coercing Ireland to
remain within the Union as it had for maintain-
ing an empire. Only the north, where the
protestant garrison was concentrated, where
emigration was lower and where, therefore, class
structures and class interests diverged less from
those of the British core, opted to remain within
the Union.
Bourgeois interests were conserved after southern
Ireland's secession by continued, accelerating
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emigration. Taxes on property or on the incomes
from it are nominal (landowners effectively pay
no income-tax) in an economy where tax rates
are otherwise more than usually high. Possession
of property is secure to the point where no
farmer has been evicted from his land, by due
process, since the establishment of the State. Land
values, partly as a result, have further appreciated
from £20 per acre in 1815 to £1,500 per acre
now. The value of land is far higher in Ireland,
relative to GNP, than in any other country, and
almost half of this land is owned by 1 per cent
of the population (Ireland, 1974).
Attempts have been made, within the limits of
vested bourgeois interests, to restructure the
southern Irish economy. Protection was attempted
in the 1 930s, but the high prices and poor quality
of protected manufactured goods fed emigration.
More recently, exporting industry has been
encouraged by capital grants and tax-holidays,2
financed through government borrowing, but the
jobs created have been fewer than the jobs lost.
However, the conservatism that brought the Irish
State into existence, that has been displayed
throughout 55 years of self-government, and that
is measured by soaring land values and declining
job numbers, offers no prospect of the radical
action necessary to deal with the fundamental
change in the circumstances of the Irish periphery
caused by Britain's retreat from empire.
The end of a relation
The two crucial elements in a gathering Irish
crisis are jobs and religion. Ireland, for almost
150 years on the periphery of the British core of
empire, has provided jobs for half its people; the
other half perished or emigrated. Much has
changed in the Irish periphery, but not the loss
of jobs. This, in southern Ireland, was 0.6 per cent
annually throughout the nineteenth century and
has continued at 0.3 per cent in the twentieth.
Adjustment to continued, long term job losses
was avoidable while the British core remained
the heart of empire and could redeploy the Irish
periphery's surplus resources. But with the passing
of empire, that facility no longer exists; Irish
emigration has ended, more swiftly than it
2 Tax-hlidays in Ireland make it possible for MNCs locating
part of an integrated process there to get tax-holidays else-
where also. Shipping 2 million tons of bauxite and 300,000
tons of crude-oil annually from West Africa for processing
into 200,000 tzins of alumina at a proposed plant at Shannon,
southern Ireland, only makes sense if the bauxite is chargedin at a price that registers a loss and therefore no tax
liability in Guinea, and the alumina is charged out at a
price that registers similar losses and zero tax liability
on smeltering and fabricating operations in Britain and other
European countries. All of the profits of the integrated
process can be credited to the Irish plant, where they are
tax-free.
commenced 140 years ago. The south's popula-
tion, reduced by 5 per cent by emigration in the
1950s, is now increasing for the first ime in 130
years, at a rate similar to that which culminated
in the Great Famine of the 1840s.
The northern situation is scarcely less grave.
Linen and shipbuilding are obsolescent and cannot
easily be replaced by industries that so felicitously
minimise the weaknesses and maximise the
strengths of the situation. Moreover, what was
a strength in expansion has become a weakness
in decline. The privileges of the protestant
garrison acquire a new significance in an island
where jobs are only available for half the
population and where, because of the run-down
of empire, the other half can no longer leave
for redeployment in the British core. Privilege is
the more obdurately defended by the protestant
holders and the more bitterly resented by the
catholics over whom it is exercised, as its value
increases. Tensions are: not eased either by the
raising of levels of educational attainment which,
as in many other parts of the former empire,
have so far been more successful in creating an
awareness of deprivation than in identifying
means of rectifying it. The religious tensions, that
formerly were a source of industrial strength,
have deteriorated into sectarian strife, to add to
the handicaps of a peripheral location and a small
market.
The gravity of the situation has been contained
in the south by massive internal debt creation
which, in 35 years, has given the Irish State
a national debt that costs more to service, relative
to GNP, than that of any other country (Central
Bank of Ireland, 1977). More recently, through
high inflation the debt has spilled over into
external borrowing that also places Ireland fore-
most with respect to sustained balance of payment
deficits relative to GNP, and on a scale beyond
the capacity or willingness of the London money
market to supply.3 External borrowing is now
principally in Eurodollars, the cost of servicing
which in Irish currencythe puntincreases with
every slide in the exchange value of the currency
(Central Bank of Ireland, 1977).
The island also benefits from an annual net
transfer by the British Government to northern
Ireland of resources worth some £500mn, and
by the purchase, at an annual cost of £lSOmn,
by the EEC of southern Ireland's dairy produce,
3 The principal difference between the Government that came
into office in the Irish Republic in June, 1977, with the
largest majority in the States history, and the one it replaced
is a commitment to reduce taxes, to increase public sector
spending, and to bridge the finance gap by still greater
external borrowing.
to add to the EEC's butter and milk-powder
"mountain". These transfers have so far made
possible welfare payments to the unemployed in
northern and southern Ireland, but they have not
changed the 130-year-old downward slide in job
numbers, nor the startling growth of unemploy-
ment as population grows more rapidly in Ireland
now than in any other European country.
The old, populist, deeply-rooted tradition of
violent, blind, ineffective protest, first against the
confiscation of land, and then against that set of
social conditions which, for a century-and-a-half
has forced every second person to emigrate,
acquires a new significance in these circumstances.
The degree of coercion practised by British forces
in the past in Ireland to suppress violence is
increasingly unacceptable to a British social
democracy that has shed its imperial interests
and is kept vividly informed by the media.
Simultaneously, the head of violence will no
longer be relieved by emigration; that half of
the population stream for which there is no
place within the Irish economy as now organised
must back up into a great lake of unemployment,
threatening to sweep away the institutions of
government imposed in the first instance by
imperial Britain, and secured thereafter by a
British army or by the outflow of those whom the
institutions disinherited. Britain's retreat from
empire has made fundamental change in Ireland
inevitable, and virtually certain within the coming
decade. The course of change in Ireland now is no
less relevant to Britain, as it adapts to its own new
role on the periphery of the European economy,
than it was when Ireland secured imperial
Britain's western flank. There is little present
prospect that change in Ireland will be radical and
orderly. The indications instead are that it will
be revolutionary and chaotic.
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